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Banco de España Public Key Infrastructure

Certificate Policy for Time-stamping Authority Certificates

Information Systems Security Unit

This document contains the Certificate Policy (CP) that regulates the certificates issued by the Corporate CA for the Banco de España Time-Stamping Authority
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction 14

1.1 Overview 14

1.2 Document Name and Identification 15

1.3 PKI Participants 15

1.3.1 Policy Management Authority 16

1.3.2 Certification Authorities 16

1.3.3 Registration Authorities 16

1.3.4 Validation Authority 16

1.3.5 Keys Archive 17

1.3.6 Certificate Subscribers 17

1.3.7 Relying Parties 17

1.3.8 Other affected parties 17

1.4 Certificate Usage 17

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate use 17

1.4.2 Certificate Usage Constraints and Restrictions 18

1.5 Policy Administration 18

1.5.1 Banco de España, as owner of PKIBDE 18

1.5.2 Contact Person 18

1.5.3 Establishment of the suitability of a CPS from an External CA as regards PKIBDE Certificate Policies of PKIBDE 18

1.5.4 Approval Procedures for this CP 18

1.6 Definitions and Acronyms 19

1.6.1 Definitions 19

1.6.2 Acronyms 20
2 Repositories and Publication of Information 22
   2.1 Repositories 22
   2.2 Publication of Certification Data 22
   2.3 Publication Timescale or Frequency 22
   2.4 Repository Access Controls 22
3 Identification and Authentication of Certificate Subscribers 23
   3.1 Naming 23
      3.1.1 Types of names 23
      3.1.2 The need for names to be meaningful 23
      3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name formats 23
      3.1.4 Uniqueness of names 23
      3.1.5 Name dispute resolution procedures 24
      3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and the role of trademarks 24
   3.2 Initial Identity Validation 24
      3.2.1 Means of proof of possession of the private key 24
      3.2.2 Identity authentication for a legal person 24
      3.2.3 Identity authentication for a natural person 24
      3.2.4 Non-verified applicant information 24
      3.2.5 Validation of authority 24
      3.2.6 Criteria for operating with external CAs 24
   3.3 Identification and Authentication in Key Renewal Requests 24
      3.3.1 Identification and authentication requirements for routine key renewal 24
      3.3.2 Identification and authentication requirements for key renewal after certificate revocation 24
4 Certificate Life Cycle Operating Requirements 25
   4.1 Certificate Application 25
      4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application? 25
4.1.2 Registration of applications for certificates and applicants' responsibilities

4.2 Certificate Application Processing 26
   4.2.1 Performance of identification and authentication procedures 26
   4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications 26
   4.2.3 Time limit for processing the certificate applications 26

4.3 Certificate Issuance 26
   4.3.1 Actions performed by the CA during the issuance of the certificate 26
   4.3.2 CA notification to the applicants of certificate issuance 27

4.4 Certificate Acceptance 27
   4.4.1 Form of certificate acceptance 27
   4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA 27
   4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other Authorities 27

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage 27
   4.5.1 Subscribers' use of the private key and certificate 27
   4.5.2 Relying parties' use of the public key and the certificate 27

4.6 Certificate Renewal with no Key Changeover 27
   4.6.1 Circumstances for certificate renewal with no key changeover 27

4.7 Certificate Renewal with Key Changeover 27
   4.7.1 Circumstances for certificate renewal with key changeover 27
   4.7.2 Who may request certificate renewal? 28
   4.7.3 Procedures for processing renewal requests with key changeover 28
   4.7.4 Notification of the new certificate issuance to the subscriber 28
   4.7.5 Manner of acceptance of certificates with changed keys 28
   4.7.6 Publication of certificates with the new keys by the CA 28
   4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other Authorities 28
4.8 Certificate Amendment 28
   4.8.1 Circumstances for certificate amendment 28

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension 29
   4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation 29
   4.9.2 Who can request revocation? 29
   4.9.3 Procedures for requesting certificate revocation 30
   4.9.4 Revocation request grace period 30
   4.9.5 Time limit for the CA to process the revocation request 30
   4.9.6 Requirements for revocation verification by relying parties 30
   4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency 30
   4.9.8 Maximum latency between the generation of CRLs and their publication 30
   4.9.9 Online certificate revocation status checking availability 30
   4.9.10 Online revocation checking requirements 31
   4.9.11 Other forms of revocation alerts available 31
   4.9.12 Special requirements for the renewal of compromised keys 31
   4.9.13 Causes for suspension 31
   4.9.14 Who can request the suspension? 31
   4.9.15 Procedure for requesting certificate suspension 31
   4.9.16 Suspension period limits 31

4.10 Certificate Status Services 31
   4.10.1 Operational characteristics 31
   4.10.2 Service availability 31
   4.10.3 Additional features 31

4.11 End of Subscription 31

4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery 32
   4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery practices and policies 32
5 Management, Operating, Installations and Physical Controls 33

5.1 Physical Security Controls 33

5.1.1 Site location and construction 33
5.1.2 Physical access 33
5.1.3 Power and air-conditioning 33
5.1.4 Water exposure 33
5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection 33
5.1.6 Storage system 33
5.1.7 Waste disposal 33
5.1.8 Offsite backup 33

5.2 Procedural Controls 33

5.2.1 Roles responsible for PKI control and management 33
5.2.2 Number of individuals required to perform each task 33
5.2.3 Identification and authentication of each user 33
5.2.4 Roles that require separation of duties 33

5.3 Personnel Security Control 34

5.3.1 Requirements concerning professional qualification, knowledge and experience 34
5.3.2 Background checks and clearance procedures 34
5.3.3 Training requirements 34
5.3.4 Retraining requirements and frequency 34
5.3.5 Frequency and sequence for job rotation 34
5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorised actions 34
5.3.7 Requirements for third party contracting 34
5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel 34

5.4 Security Audit Procedures 34
5.4.1 Types of events recorded 34
5.4.2 Frequency with which audit logs are processed 34
5.4.3 Period for which audit logs are kept 34
5.4.4 Audit log protection 34
5.4.5 Audit log back up procedures 34
5.4.6 Audit data collection system (internal vs. external) 35
5.4.7 Notification to the subject who caused the event 35
5.4.8 Vulnerability assessment 35

5.5 Records Archive 35
5.5.1 Types of events archived 35
5.5.2 Archive retention period 35
5.5.3 Archive protection 35
5.5.4 Archive backup procedures 35
5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping records 35
5.5.6 Audit data archive system (internal vs. external) 35
5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archived information 35

5.6 CA Key Changeover 35

5.7 Compromised Key and Disaster Recovery 35
5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures 35
5.7.2 Corruption of computing resources, software, and/or data 35
5.7.3 Action procedures in the event of compromise of an Authority’s private key 36
5.7.4 Installation following a natural disaster or other type of catastrophe 36

5.8 CA or RA Termination 36
5.8.1 Certification Authority 36
5.8.2 Registration Authority 36

6 Technical Security Controls 37
6.1 Key pair generation and installation 37

6.1.1 Key pair generation 37

6.1.2 Delivery of private keys to subscribers 37

6.1.3 Delivery of the public key to the certificate issuer 37

6.1.4 Delivery of the CA’s public key to relying parties 37

6.1.5 Key sizes 37

6.1.6 Public key generation parameters and quality checks 37

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (KeyUsage field in X.509 v3) 37

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 38

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards 38

6.2.2 Private key multi-person (k out of n) control 38

6.2.3 Escrow of private keys 38

6.2.4 Private key backup copy 38

6.2.5 Private key archive 38

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module 38

6.2.7 Private key storage in a cryptographic module 38

6.2.8 Private key activation method 38

6.2.9 Private key deactivation method 38

6.2.10 Private key destruction method 39

6.2.11 Cryptographic module classification 39

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 39

6.3.1 Public key archive 39

6.3.2 Operational period of certificates and usage periods for key pairs 39

6.4 Activation Data 39

6.4.1 Generation and installation of activation data 39

6.4.2 Activation data protection 39
6.4.3 Other activation data aspects 39

6.5 Computer Security Controls 39
   6.5.1 Specific security technical requirements 39
   6.5.2 Computer security evaluation 39

6.6 Life Cycle Security Controls 39
   6.6.1 System development controls 39
   6.6.2 Security management controls 39
   6.6.3 Life cycle security controls 40

6.7 Network Security Controls 40

6.8 Time-Stamping 40

7 Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles 41
   7.1 Certificate Profile 41
      7.1.1 Version number 41
      7.1.2 Certificate extensions 41
      7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers (OID) 43
      7.1.4 Name formats 43
      7.1.5 Name constraints 43
      7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifiers (OID) 43
      7.1.7 Use of the "PolicyConstraints" extension 43
      7.1.8 Syntax and semantics of the "PolicyQualifier" 44
      7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical "CertificatePolicy" extension 44

7.2 CRL Profile 44
   7.2.1 Version number 44
   7.2.2 CRL and extensions 44

7.3 OCSP Profile 44
   7.3.1 Version number(s) 44
7.3.2 OCSP Extensions 44

8 Compliance Audit and Other Controls 45

8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Controls for each Authority 45

8.2 Identity/Qualifications of the Auditor 45

8.3 Relationship between the Assessor and the Entity being Assessed 45

8.4 Aspects Covered by Controls 45

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiencies found 45

8.6 Notification of the results 45

9 Other business and legal matters 46

9.1 Fees 46

9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees 46

9.1.2 Certificate access fees 46

9.1.3 Revocation or status information fees 46

9.1.4 Fees for other services, such as policy information 46

9.1.5 Refund policy 46

9.2 Information Confidentiality 46

9.2.1 Scope of confidential information 46

9.2.2 Non-confidential information 46

9.2.3 Duty to maintain professional secrecy 46

9.3 Personal Data Protection 46

9.3.1 Personal data protection policy 46

9.3.2 Information considered private 46

9.3.3 Information not classified as private 47

9.3.4 Responsibility to protect personal data 47

9.3.5 Notification of and consent to the use of personal data 47

9.3.6 Disclosure within legal proceedings 47
9.3.7 Other circumstances in which data may be made public 47

9.4 Intellectual Property Rights 47

9.5 Obligations 47
   9.5.1 Obligations of the CA 47
   9.5.2 Obligations of the RA 47
   9.5.3 Obligations incumbent on certificate subscribers 47
   9.5.4 Obligations incumbent on relying parties 47
   9.5.5 Obligations incumbent on other participants 48

9.6 Liabilities 48
   9.6.1 PKIBDE’s liabilities 48
   9.6.2 PKIBDE liability exemption 48
   9.6.3 Scope of liability coverage 48

9.7 Loss Limits 48

9.8 Validity Period 48
   9.8.1 Term 48
   9.8.2 CP substitution and termination 48
   9.8.3 Consequences of termination 49

9.9 Individual notices and communications with participants 49

9.10 Specification amendment procedures 49
   9.10.1 Amendment procedures 49
   9.10.2 Notification period and mechanism 49
   9.10.3 Circumstances in which the OID must be changed 49

9.11 Disputes and Jurisdiction 49

9.12 Governing Law 49

9.13 Compliance with applicable law 49

9.14 Miscellaneous provisions 49
9.14.1 Entire agreement clause 49

9.14.2 Independence 49

9.14.3 Resolution through the courts 49

9.15 Other Provisions 50

10 Personal Data Protection 51

10.1 Data Protection Legal Scheme 51

10.2 File Creation and Registration 51

10.3 Personal Data Protection Act Security Document 51
1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document sets out the Certificate Policy (CP) governing the certificates issued by the Time-Stamping Authority (hereinafter, TSA) by the Banco de España Public Key Infrastructure (hereinafter, PKIBDE). In particular, this CP governs the certificates issued by the Banco de España Time-Stamping Authority, TSABDE.

From the perspective of the X.509 v3 standard, a CP is a set of rules that define the applicability or use of a certificate within a community of users, systems or specific class of applications that have a series of security requirements in common.

This CP details and completes the "Certification Practice Statement" (CPS) of the Banco de España's PKI (PKIBDE), containing the rules by which the use of the certificates defined in this policy are governed, as well as the scope of application and the technical characteristics of this type of certificate.

This CP, with the exception of section 9, which contains a slight variation, has been structured in accordance with the guidelines of the PKIX work group in the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) in its reference document RFC 3647 (approved in November 2003) "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework". In order to give the document a uniform structure and facilitate its reading and analysis, all the sections established in RFC 3647 have been included. Where nothing has been established for any section the phrase “No stipulation” will appear. Additionally, apart from the headings established in RFC 3647, a new chapter has been included that deals with personal data protection in order to comply with Spanish legislation on this matter.

The CP includes all the activities aimed at managing Time-Stamping Authority certificates during their life cycle. Consequently, all the parties involved must be aware of the content of the CP and adapt their activities to the stipulations therein.

This CP assumes that the reader is aware of the concepts of PKI, certificate, electronic signature, TSA, time-stamping services and time-stamp token.

The general architecture, in hierarchic terms, of the Banco de España's PKI is as follows:
1.2 Document Name and Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document name</th>
<th>Certificate Policy (CP) for PKIBDE Time-Stamping Certificates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Document version</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document status</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of issue</td>
<td>21.05.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expiry date</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OID (Object Identifier)</td>
<td>1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.11.1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS location</td>
<td><a href="http://pki.bde.es/politicas">http://pki.bde.es/politicas</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related CPS</td>
<td>Certification Practice Statement of the Banco de España’s PKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 PKI Participants

The participating entities and persons are:
- Banco de España, as owner of PKIBDE.
- The Policy Management Authority.
- The Certification Authorities.
- The Registration Authorities.
- The Validation Authorities.
- The Keys Archive.
- The Applicants and Subscribers of the certificates issued by PKIBDE.
- The Relying Parties of the certificates issued by PKIBDE.
1.3.1 Policy Management Authority

The Policy Management Authority is defined in accordance with the PKIBDE Certification Practice Statement (hereinafter, CPS).

1.3.2 Certification Authorities

Certification Authorities are defined as per the PKIBDE CPS.

The Certification Authorities that make up PKIBDE are:

Root CA - First-level Certification Authority. This CA only issues certificates for itself and its Subordinate CAs. It will only be in operation whilst carrying out the operations for which it is established. Its most significant data are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinguished Name</th>
<th>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA – AC RAIZ, O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA,C=ES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serial Number</td>
<td>F16D 7586 5D7C CF92 41AD A17A CD9A 3DE2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Name of Issuer</td>
<td>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA – AC RAIZ, O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA,C=ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity Period</td>
<td>From 08-07-2004 11:34:12 to 08-07-2034 11:34:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Digest (SHA-1)</td>
<td>2B60 DE7D 3337 8BF7 5B67 8B10 77BB F951 6029 D6A8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corporate CA: Certification Authority subordinate to the Root CA. Its duty is to issue certificates for PKIBDE users. This CP refers to TSA certificates issued by the same. Its most significant data are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinguished Name</th>
<th>CN= BANCO DE ESPAÑA – AC CORPORATIVA, O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA, C=ES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serial Number</td>
<td>366A 524D A5E4 4AF8 4108 A140 9B9B 76EB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Name of Issuer</td>
<td>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA-AC RAIZ, O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA,C=ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Digest (SHA-1)</td>
<td>ABE6 1ED2 5AF6 4253 F77B 322F 6F21 3729 B539 1BDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.3 Registration Authorities

The Registration Authorities are defined in accordance with the PKIBDE Certification Practice Statement.

TSA Certificates will be issued by the PKIBDE Administrators, which shall act as Registration Authorities to verify applicants' details and to generate certification/repeal requests, directly using the Corporate CA administration.

1.3.4 Validation Authority

Validation Authority is defined as per the PKIBDE CPS.
1.3.5 Keys Archive

The Keys Archive defined in the CPS is not applicable in this certificate policy.

1.3.6 Certificate Subscribers

Certificate subscribers are defined as per the PKIBDE CPS.

The type of entities that can be subscribers of the certificates referred to in this CP are limited to those shown in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certification Environment</th>
<th>Subscribers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporate CA</td>
<td>Time-Stamping Authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be recalled that these Time-Stamping Authorities may be internal (e.g. TSABDE) or external to Banco de España. In both cases, there shall be a supervisor for each TSA. The type of individuals who can act as component managers are set out in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificate type</th>
<th>Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time-Stamping Authority Certificates</td>
<td>Time-Stamping Authority Supervisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.7 Relying Parties

Relying parties are defined as per the PKIBDE CPS. In particular, they shall be those who recognise and make use of the Time-Stamp Tokens issued by a TSA, whose certificate has been issued by PKIBDE under this CP.

1.3.8 Other affected parties

Applicants: They are the Time-Stamping Authority Supervisors.

CA Administrator: Individuals within Banco de España who manage the TSA certificate requests and have CA administration privileges.

1.4 Certificate Usage

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate use

The Time-Stamping Authority owning the certificate shall have a “Time-Stamping Policy” in place, compliant with acknowledged best practices for rendering time-stamping services.

It shall likewise have an updated “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices” document that describes said policy, which is accessible to the public and free of charge, which indicates its supervisors and describes its obligations and liabilities, the processes and procedures for managing and operating the TSA, key life cycles, security mechanisms, etc.

The following table shows appropriate usage of certificates in greater detail:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificate type</th>
<th>Appropriate Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time-Stamping Authority Certificates</td>
<td>Rendering of time-stamping services (compliant with the “TSA Time-Stamping Policies and Practices” of the TSA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.2  **Certificate Usage Constraints and Restrictions**

Any other use not included in the previous point shall be excluded.

1.5  **Policy Administration**

1.5.1  **Banco de España, as owner of PKIBDE.**

This CP belongs to Banco de España:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Banco de España</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-mail address</td>
<td><a href="mailto:pkibde@bde.es">pkibde@bde.es</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>C/Alcalá, 48.   28014 - Madrid (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone No.</td>
<td>+34913385000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax</td>
<td>+34915310059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5.2  **Contact Person**

This CP is managed by the PKIBDE Policy Management Authority (PMA).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Information Systems Department Banco de España PKI Policy Management Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-mail address</td>
<td><a href="mailto:pkibde@bde.es">pkibde@bde.es</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td>C/Alcalá, 522. 28027 - Madrid (Spain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone No.</td>
<td>+34913386610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax</td>
<td>+34913386870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5.3  **Establishment of the suitability of a CPS from an External CA as regards PKIBDE Certificate Policies of PKIBDE**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

1.5.4  **Approval Procedures for this CP**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.
1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

1.6.1 Definitions

Within the scope of this CP the following terms are used:

Authentication: the process of verifying the identity of an applicant or subscriber of a PKIBDE certificate.

Time-Stamping Authority (TSA): authority that issues time-stamp tokens.

Electronic Certificate: A document signed electronically by a certification services provider, which links signature verification data to a signatory and confirms their identity. This is the definition contained in Law 59/2003, which this document extends to cases in which the signature verification data is linked to a computer component.

Public Key and Private Key: the asymmetric cryptography on which the PKI is based uses a key pair in which what is enciphered with one of these can only be deciphered by the other, and vice versa. One of these keys is "public" and includes the electronic certificate, whilst the other is "private" and is only known by the certificate subscriber and, when appropriate, by the Keys Archive.

Session Key: key established to encipher communication between two entities. The key is established specifically for each communication, or session, and its utility expires upon termination of the session.

Directory: information repository that follows the ITU-T X.500 standard.

Identification: the process of establishing the identity of an applicant or subscriber of a PKIBDE certificate.

User Identifier: a set of characters that are used to uniquely identify the user of a system.

Trust Hierarchy: set of certification authorities that maintain a relationship of trust by which a CA of a higher level guarantees the trustworthiness of one or several lower level CAs. In the case of PKIBDE, the hierarchy has two levels, the Root CA on the higher level guarantees the reliability of its subordinate CAs.

Provider of Certification Services: individual or entity that issues electronic certificates or provides other services related to the electronic signature.

Applicants: person who requests a certificate for themselves, for a legal person or for a Time-Stamping Authority.

Relying Parties: individuals or entities other than subscribers that decide to accept and rely on a certificate issued by PKIBDE.

Subscribers: person, computer component or entity (e.g.: Time-Stamping Authority) for which an electronic certificate is issued by the latter or by its applicant.

UTC (Coordinated Universal Time): a time-zone of reference with respect to which all the other time-zones in the world are calculated. Defined in ITU-R Recommendation TF.460-5

UTC(k): time-scale performed by the “k” laboratory and maintained in accordance with UTC, in order to attain a tolerance margin of ±100 ns with respect to it (Recommendation TF.536-1)

Subscriber: an entity requesting TSA services and which has explicitly or implicitly accepted its terms and conditions.
**Time-stamping policy:** set of rules governing the applicability of the time-stamp token for a particular community and/or its application with some common security requirements.

**TSA Practices Statement:** a statement of the practices that a TSA performs in issuing time-stamp tokens.

**Time-stamp token:** a document signed electronically by the TSA which ties the representation of a piece of data to a specific time, thus establishing that said piece of data existed prior to said moment.

**TSA System:** a set of IT products and other components organised to support the provision of time-stamp services.

**Time-Stamp Unit:** a set of hard- and software that have a single active time-stamp token signature key at a given moment.

### 1.6.2 Acronyms

- **PAA:** Policy Management Authority
- **CA:** Certification Authority
- **RA:** Registration Authority
- **VA:** Validation Authority
- **CRL:** Certificate Revocation List
- **C:** (Country). Distinguished Name (DN) attribute of an object within the X.500 directory structure
- **CEN:** Comité Européen de Normalisation
- **CN:** Common Name Distinguished Name (DN) attribute of an object within the X.500 directory structure
- **CWA:** CEN Workshop Agreement
- **DN:** Distinguished Name. Unique identification of an entry within the X.500 directory structure
- **CPS:** Certification Practice Statement
- **ETSI:** European Telecommunications Standard Institute
- **FIPS:** Federal Information Processing Standard
- **HSM:** Hardware Security Module: Cryptographic security module used to store keys and carry out secure cryptographic operations.
- **IETF:** Internet Engineering Task Force (internet standardisation organisation)
- **LDAP:** Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
- **O:** Organisation. Distinguished Name (DN) attribute of an object within the X.500 directory structure.
- **OCSP:** Online Certificate Status Protocol: This protocol enables online verification of the validity of an electronic certificate.
- **OID:** Object Identifier
- **OU:** Organisational Unit. Distinguished Name (DN) attribute of an object within the X.500 directory structure.
- **CP:** Certificate Policy
PKCS: Public Key Infrastructure Standards: Internationally accepted PKI standards developed by RSA Laboratories.

PKI: Public Key Infrastructure

PKIBDE: Banco de España PKI

PKIX: Work group within the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Group) set up for the purpose of developing PKI and internet specifications.

RFC: Request For Comments (Standard issued by the IETF)

TSA: Time-Stamping Authority

TSU: Time-stamping Unit

UTC: Coordinated Universal Time
2 Repositories and Publication of Information

2.1 Repositories
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

2.2 Publication of Certification Data
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

2.3 Publication Timescale or Frequency
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

2.4 Repository Access Controls
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.
3 Identification and Authentication of Certificate Subscribers

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of names

The certificates issued by PKIBDE contain the Distinguished Name (or DN) X.500 of the issuer and that of the certificate subject in the fields issuer name and subject name, respectively.

The CN (Common Name) attribute of the DN will refer to the code assigned to the Time-Stamping Authority owner of the certificate.

If there is more than one TSU for one same Time-Stamping Authority, the CN shall conclude with a numerical code that solely identifies each TSU.

The component certificate’s CN will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificate type</th>
<th>CN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time-Stamping Authority Certificates</td>
<td>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA – TSA CORPORATIVA num_dif</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where num_dif is an optional number that differentiates different certificates generated by one same Time-Stamping Authority that has a number of TSUs. Said number will be composed of two digits and, if required, will be completed by a zero to the left.

The rest of the DN attributes shall have the following fixed values:

O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA, C=ES

3.1.2 The need for names to be meaningful

In all cases the distinguished name of the certificates must be meaningful and are subject to the rules established in the previous point in this respect.

3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name formats

The rule applied by PKIBDE for the interpretation of the distinguished names for subscribers of the certificates it issues is the ISO/IEC 9595 (X.500) Distinguished Name (DN) standard.

3.1.4 Uniqueness of names

Certificate DNs may not be repeated.

Should more than one certificate be issued for one same TSA because it has several TSUs, these certificates shall be differentiated by a distinctive number at the end of the corresponding CN.

There cannot be more than one certificate for one same TSU, given for a particular TSA.
3.1.5 Name dispute resolution procedures

Any dispute concerning ownership of names shall be resolved as stipulated in point 9.13 Claims and Jurisdiction in this document.

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and the role of trademarks

No stipulation.

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1 Means of proof of possession of the private key

Possession of the private key, companion of the public key for which the TSA supervisor requests a certificate be generated, shall be proven by sending the certification request, which shall include the public key signed using the companion private key.

3.2.2 Identity authentication for a legal person

Certificates from Time-Stamping Authorities are not electronic certificates for legal persons as defined in Section 7, Law 59/2003, dated 19 December, the Electronic Signature Act.

3.2.3 Identity authentication for a natural person

Under this policy, the identity of natural persons shall be authenticated by the electronic signature on the application using a natural person certificate issued by a CSP recognised by Banco de España for these purposes or by PKIBDE. Validation of the identity of the natural person will have been carried out in accordance with the procedures established by the PCS or by PKIBDE.

3.2.4 Non-verified applicant information

Ownership of the domain names or e-mail addresses will not be verified, if it is necessary to include them in the certificate.

3.2.5 Validation of authority

The applicant shall have to be the supervisor of the Banco de España TSA.

3.2.6 Criteria for operating with external CAs

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

3.3 Identification and Authentication in Key Renewal Requests

3.3.1 Identification and authentication requirements for routine key renewal

The individual identification process shall be the same as in the initial validation.

3.3.2 Identification and authentication requirements for key renewal after certificate revocation

The individual identification process shall be the same as in the initial validation.
4 Certificate Life Cycle Operating Requirements

This chapter contains the operating requirements for the life cycle of Time-Stamping Authority certificates issued by the Corporate CA.

Although these certificates should be stored on cryptographic support hardware, this Certificate Policy does not undertake to regulate the management of said elements.

On the other hand, in this chapter some illustrations will be provided for better understanding. In the event of any difference or discrepancy between the text and the illustrations, the text will prevail in all cases, given the necessary synthetic nature of the illustrations.

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application?

The request for a Time-Stamping Authority Certificate must be submitted by the TSA supervisor using a natural person certificate. Said supervisor must have the necessary powers of attorney accrediting them as such.

Application for a certificate does not mean it will be obtained if the applicant does not fulfil the requirements established for TSA certificates in the CPS or in this CP.

4.1.2 Registration of applications for certificates and applicants' responsibilities

1 The application shall be sent by e-mail to Banco de España. The electronic signature may be made either on the document itself or on the application document, or alternatively on the e-mail used to send the request, by one of the natural person certificates of the TSA supervisor issued by a CSP recognised by Banco de España for these purposes or by the PKIBDE.

As regards content, the application must include the certificate signing request (CSR) with the associated public key, as well as the information necessary for the CA to generate the certificate.

2 The PKIBDE manager or supervisor shall verify the applicant's powers of attorney, already available in Banco de España, as a prerequisite for approving issue of the certificate.

3 A remote CA administrator will receive the e-mail message with the go-ahead, verify the electronic signature and perform the necessary checks on the data and information the applicant has provided. If everything is correct, the remote administrator will connect to request the certificate be issued using a certificate request (CSR) with the public key.

4 The CA issues the certificate and the remote administrator subsequently downloads the corresponding file.

5 Banco de España sends the applicant the certificate by e-mail.

The following illustration offers a summary of the process described:
4.2 Certificate Application Processing

4.2.1 Performance of identification and authentication procedures

The PKIBDE manager or supervisor will identify and authenticate the applicant by validating the electronic signature on the application or on the e-mail used to send it.

4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications

Certificates will be issued once PKIBDE has completed the verifications necessary to validate the certificate application.

For these purposes, PKIBDE or its managers and supervisors can collect the documentation they consider necessary from the applicant.

4.2.3 Time limit for processing the certificate applications

The PKIBDE Corporate CA shall not be held liable for any delays that may arise in the period between application for the certificate, publication in the PKIBDE repository and its delivery. The Corporate CA will process the requests as quickly as possible.

4.3 Certificate Issuance

4.3.1 Actions performed by the CA during the issuance of the certificate

Issuance of the certificate signifies final approval of the application by the CA.

When the PKIBDE Corporate CA issues a certificate pursuant to a certificate application, it will make the notifications established under point 4.3.2. of this chapter.

All certificates will become effective upon issue, unless the certificate indicates a later date and time of coming into force, which may not be more than 15 calendar days following issue. The period of validity is subject to possible early, temporary or permanent termination in the event of circumstances that give cause to the suspension or revocation of the certificate.
4.3.2 CA notification to the applicants of certificate issuance

Applicants will be advised of the issuance of the certificate via e-mail.

4.4 Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1 Form of certificate acceptance

Application for the certificate carries the applicants’ implicit acceptance of the CPS and the CP, as well as of the certificate.

4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA

The Time-Stamping Authority Certificate will be published in the PKIBDE repository.

4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other Authorities

Not applicable.

4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

4.5.1 Subscribers’ use of the private key and certificate

Subscribers may only use the private key and the certificate for the uses authorised under this CP and pursuant to the provisions in the ‘Key Usage’ and ‘Extended Key Usage’ fields of the certificate, and with the stipulations of its “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices”. Likewise, subscribers may only use the key pair and the certificate once they have accepted the terms and conditions of use established in the CPS and CP, and only for that which is stipulated therein.

Following certificate expiry or revocation, subscribers must cease to use the private key.

4.5.2 Relying parties’ use of the public key and the certificate

Relying parties should only trust certificates for the purposes set forth in this CP, the TSA “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices” and in accordance with the ‘Key Usage’ field on the certificate.

To trust the certificate, relying parties must successfully complete public key transactions, and take responsibility for verifying the certificate status using the means set forth by the CPS and in this CP. They are likewise bound to the conditions of use established in these documents.

4.6 Certificate Renewal with no Key Changeover

4.6.1 Circumstances for certificate renewal with no key changeover

All certificate renewals covered by this CP shall be carried out with change of keys. Consequently, the remaining points in section 4.6 (4.6.2 to 4.6.7) established in RFC 3647 are not included and, therefore, for the purposes of this CP, their content is "no stipulation".

4.7 Certificate Renewal with Key Changeover

4.7.1 Circumstances for certificate renewal with key changeover

A TSA certificate may be renewed for the following reasons, among others:
- Expiry of the validity period.
- Modification of the data contained in the certificate.
- When the keys are compromised or are no longer fully reliable.
- Change of format.

All renewals, regardless of their cause, shall be carried out with a change of keys.

4.7.2 Who may request certificate renewal?

Renewal must be requested by the TSA supervisor.

4.7.3 Procedures for processing renewal requests with key changeover

During the renewal process, the CA will check that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the subscriber are still valid. If any of the subscriber’s data have changed, they must be verified and registered with the agreement of the TSA supervisor.

The requirements for renewal will be the same as those for initial certificate issue.

If any of the conditions established in this CP have changed, the TSA supervisor must be made aware of this and agree to it.

In any case, certificate renewal is subject to:
- The request being made in due time and manner, following the instructions and regulations established by PKIBDE specifically for this purpose.
- The CA not having certain knowledge of the existence of any cause for the revocation / suspension of the certificate.
- The request for the renewal of the provision of services being for the same type of certificate as the one initially issued.

4.7.4 Notification of the new certificate issuance to the subscriber

The TSA supervisor will be notified by e-mail.

4.7.5 Manner of acceptance of certificates with changed keys

Renewal of the certificate entails the applicants’ implicit acceptance of the CPS and the CP, as well as of the certificate.

4.7.6 Publication of certificates with the new keys by the CA

The TSA certificate will be published in the PKIBDE repository.

4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other Authorities

No stipulation.

4.8 Certificate Amendment

4.8.1 Circumstances for certificate amendment

All certificate amendments carried out within the scope of this CP will be treated as certificate renewals and, therefore, the previous points in this respect shall be applicable.
Consequently, the remaining points in section 4.8 (4.8.2 to 4.8.7) established in RFC 3647 are not included, meaning that, for the purpose of this Statement, they are not regulated.

4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

Certificate revocation is the action that renders a certificate invalid prior to its expiry date. Certificate revocation produces the discontinuance of the certificate’s validity, rendering it permanently inoperative as regards its inherent uses and, therefore, discontinuance of the provision of certification services. Revocation of a certificate prevents its legitimate use by the subscriber.

Revocation of a certificate entails its publication on the public-access Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL).

Causes for revocation:
- Loss, disclosure, modification or any other circumstance that compromises the subscriber’s private key or when suspicion of such compromise exists.
- Deliberate misuse of keys and certificates, or failure to observe or infringement of the operational requirements contained in the CPS or in this CP.
- TSA ceasing to perform its functions, a circumstance that entitled it to hold the certificate.
- Ceasing of PKIBDE activity.
- Defective issue of a certificate due to:
  1. Failure to comply with the material requirements for certificate issuance.
  2. Reasonable belief that basic information related to the certificate is or could be false.
  3. The existence of a data entry error or any other processing error.
- The key pair generated by the subscriber has been found to be "weak".
- The information contained in a certificate or used for the application becomes inaccurate.
- By order given from the TSA supervisor or an authorised third party or natural person applicant representing a legal person.
- The certificate of a higher CA in the certificate trust hierarchy is revoked.
- Any of the other causes specified in this CP or in the CPS.

The main effect of revocation as regards the certificate is the immediate and early termination of its term of validity, with which the certificate becomes invalid. Revocation shall not affect the underlying obligations created or notified by this CPS, nor shall its effects be retroactive.

4.9.2 Who can request revocation?

PKIBDE or any of the Authorities that comprise the former may, of their own accord, request the revocation of a certificate if they become aware or suspect that the TSA’s private key has been compromised, or in the event of any other factor that recommends taking such action.

Likewise, the TSA supervisor may also request revocation of their certificates, which they must do in accordance with the conditions set forth in section 4.9.3.
4.9.3 *Procedures for requesting certificate revocation*

Requests for revocation shall be carried out by the TSA supervisor in a similar manner as that described in section 4.1.2 for the issue request. They shall always be processed by the PKIBDE manager or supervisor.

Apart from this ordinary procedure, PKIBDE operators and managers may immediately revoke any certificate upon becoming aware of the existence of any of the causes for revocation.

4.9.4 *Revocation request grace period*

Revocation shall be carried out immediately following the processing of each request that is verified as valid. Therefore, the process will not include a grace period during which the revocation request may be cancelled.

4.9.5 *Time limit for the CA to process the revocation request*

Requests for revocation of TSA certificates must be processed as quickly as possible, and in no case may said processing take more than 24 hours.

4.9.6 *Requirements for revocation verification by relying parties*

Verification of revocations is mandatory for each use made of a TSA certificate.

Relying parties must check the validity of the CRL prior to each use and download the new CRL from the PKIBDE repository when the one they hold expires. CRLs stored in cache\(^1\) memory, even when not expired, do not guarantee availability of updated revocation data.

Alternatively, a PKIBDE Validation Authority can be used (if available as per the provisions set forth in section 2.1 of this CP) to verify online the certificate revocation status.

4.9.7 *CRL issuance frequency*

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

4.9.8 *Maximum latency between the generation of CRLs and their publication*

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

4.9.9 *Online certificate revocation status checking availability*

Alternatively, PKIBDE has an online system (Validation Authority) for verifying the status of a certificate.

The web addresses for accessing the CRLs and the Validation Authority, together with their features and usage constraints, are given in section 2.1 Repository.

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\(^1\)Cache memory: memory that stores the necessary data for the system to operate faster, as it does not have to obtain this data from the source for every operation. Its use could entail the risk of operating with outdated data.
4.9.10 Online revocation checking requirements

When using the Validation Authority, relying parties must have software capable of operating with the OCSP protocol compliant with RFC 3161 to obtain the certificate information.

4.9.11 Other forms of revocation alerts available

No stipulation.

4.9.12 Special requirements for the renewal of compromised keys

There are no variations to the aforementioned clauses for revocation due to private key compromise.

4.9.13 Causes for suspension

There is no provision for the suspension of TSA certificates.

4.9.14 Who can request the suspension?

No stipulation.

4.9.15 Procedure for requesting certificate suspension

No stipulation.

4.9.16 Suspension period limits

No stipulation.

4.10 Certificate Status Services

4.10.1 Operational characteristics

As specified in PKiBDE's CPS.

4.10.2 Service availability

As specified in PKiBDE's CPS.

4.10.3 Additional features

As specified in PKiBDE's CPS.

4.11 End of Subscription

Certificate subscription may be ended due to the following causes:

- Early certificate revocation due to any of the causes established in point 4.9.1.
- Expiry of the certificate.

If certificate renewal is not requested, the end of the subscription will terminate the relationship between the subscriber and the CA.
4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery practices and policies

The private key for certificates used by TSA is not archived.

4.12.2 Session key protection and recovery policies and practices

No stipulation.
5 Management, Operating, Installations and Physical Controls

5.1 Physical Security Controls

5.1.1 Site location and construction
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.2 Physical access
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.3 Power and air-conditioning
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.4 Water exposure
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.6 Storage system
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.7 Waste disposal
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.1.8 Offsite backup
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.2 Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Roles responsible for PKI control and management
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.2.2 Number of individuals required to perform each task
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.2.3 Identification and authentication of each user
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.2.4 Roles that require separation of duties
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.
5.3 Personnel Security Control

5.3.1 Requirements concerning professional qualification, knowledge and experience
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.2 Background checks and clearance procedures
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.3 Training requirements
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.4 Retraining requirements and frequency
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.5 Frequency and sequence for job rotation
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorised actions
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.7 Requirements for third party contracting
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.4 Security Audit Procedures

5.4.1 Types of events recorded
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.4.2 Frequency with which audit logs are processed
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.4.3 Period for which audit logs are kept
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.4.4 Audit log protection
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

5.4.5 Audit log back up procedures
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.
5.4.6 Audit data collection system (internal vs. external)
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.4.7 Notification to the subject who caused the event
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessment
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5 Records Archive

5.5.1 Types of events archived
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5.2 Archive retention period
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5.3 Archive protection
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping records
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5.6 Audit data archive system (internal vs. external)
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archived information
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.6 CA Key Changeover
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.7 Compromised Key and Disaster Recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.7.2 Corruption of computing resources, software, and/or data
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.
5.7.3  Action procedures in the event of compromise of an Authority's private key
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.7.4  Installation following a natural disaster or other type of catastrophe
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.8  CA or RA Termination

5.8.1  Certification Authority
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

5.8.2  Registration Authority
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.
6 Technical Security Controls

Technical security controls for PKIBDE internal components, and specifically for Root CA and Corporate CA in the TSA certificate issuing and signing processes, are detailed in the Certification Practices Statement (CPS) of the PKIBDE.

This section describes the technical security controls to be fulfilled by a Time-Stamping Authority holding a certificate issued under this CP.

6.1 Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

Key generation for Time-Stamping Authority certificates must be carried out by the TSA itself using cryptographic hardware modules holding FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or similar, and pursuant to the provisions in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.1.2 Delivery of private keys to subscribers

Not applicable, given that private keys must always be generated by the TSA.

6.1.3 Delivery of the public key to the certificate issuer

The public key is delivered using a file in PKCS#10 format attached to the certificate request application (CSR).

6.1.4 Delivery of the CA’s public key to relying parties

The Corporate CA’s public key is included in the CA’s certificate. The Corporate CA’s certificate is not included in the subscriber’s certificate. The Corporate CA’s certificate must be obtained from the repository, specifying in this document where it is available for certificate subscribers and relying parties to carry out any type of verification.

6.1.5 Key sizes

The minimum size for TSA certificate keys is 2048 bits.

6.1.6 Public key generation parameters and quality checks

TSA public keys are encoded pursuant to RFC 3280 and PKCS#1. The key generation algorithm is the RSA.

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (KeyUsage field in X.509 v3)

The keys defined by this policy and by extension the certificates associated to them, will be used to render time-stamping services and, in particular, for issuing time-stamp tokens by the TSA holding the certificate.

For this purpose, the ‘Key Usage’ and ‘Extended Key Usage’ fields of the certificate include the following uses:

---

CERTIFICATE POLICY FOR TIME-StampING AUTHORITY CERTIFICATES 37
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificate type</th>
<th>Key Usage</th>
<th>Extended Key Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSA Certificate</td>
<td>digitalSignature, nonRepudiation</td>
<td>TimeStamping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

In particular, it must have a security level equivalent to or higher than FIPS 140-2 level 3.

6.2.2 Private key multi-person (k out of n) control

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.2.3 Escrow of private keys

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

In particular, the private keys for TSA certificates must be housed in cryptographic hardware devices certified to FIPS-2 level 3 equivalent or above, and only accessible by the TSA.

6.2.4 Private key backup copy

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.2.5 Private key archive

This CP prohibits archiving the TSA private key anywhere other than in a cryptographic module.

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.2.7 Private key storage in a cryptographic module

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

In particular, private keys must be generated in a cryptographic module at the time each of the Time-Stamp Units (TSU) making up the TSA are created and they must be stored in enciphered format.

6.2.8 Private key activation method

The TSA will activate the private key associated with the certificate issued under this CP pursuant to TSA specifications in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.2.9 Private key deactivation method

The TSA will deactivate the private key associated with the certificate issued under this CP pursuant to TSA specifications in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.
6.2.10 *Private key destruction method*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.2.11 *Cryptographic module classification*

The TSA cryptographic module must hold certification equivalent to or higher than FIPS-2 level 3. The specification details must be included in the Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.3 *Other Aspects of Key Pair Management*

6.3.1 *Public key archive*

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

6.3.2 *Operational period of certificates and usage periods for key pairs*

TSA certificates and their associated key pair have a lifetime of 8 years, although the Corporate CA may establish a shorter period at the time of their issue.

6.4 *Activation Data*

6.4.1 *Generation and installation of activation data*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.4.2 *Activation data protection*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.4.3 *Other activation data aspects*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.5 *Computer Security Controls*

6.5.1 *Specific security technical requirements*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.5.2 *Computer security evaluation*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.6 *Life Cycle Security Controls*

6.6.1 *System development controls*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.6.2 *Security management controls*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.
6.6.3  *Life cycle security controls*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.7  *Network Security Controls*

As the TSA specifies in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

6.8  *Time-Stamping*

The certificates issued under this CP may be used by the holder TSA for rendering time-stamping services, as it has specified in its Time-Stamping Policies and Practices.

Hence, said TSA must guarantee the security of the time included on the time-stamp tokens it issues, by periodically synchronising them with a reliable time source.
7 Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

7.1.1 Version number

Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) certificates issued by the Corporate CA use the X.509 version 3 (X.509 v3) standard.

7.1.2 Certificate extensions

The certificate extensions used generically are:
- Subject Key Identifier Classified as non-critical.
- Authority Key Identifier Classified as non-critical.
- KeyUsage. Classified as critical.
- extKeyUsage Classified as critical.
- BasicConstraint. Classified as critical.
- CRLDistributionPoint. Classified as non-critical.
- Subject Alternate Name. Classified as non-critical.
- bdeCertType (1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.3.6). Classified as non-critical.

The table below shows the profile of the Time-Stamping Authority certificates issued by PKIBDE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD X509v1</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Version</td>
<td>V3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Serial Number</td>
<td>&lt;The one corresponding, assigned by the Corporate CA of BdE, which issues this certificate&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Signature Algorithm</td>
<td>SHA-1WithRSASignature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Issuer Distinguished Name</td>
<td>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA–AC CORPORATIVA, O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA, C=ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lifetime</td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Subject</td>
<td>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA–TSA CORPORATIVA &lt;num_diff&gt; O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA C=ES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Subject Public Key Info</td>
<td>Algorithm: RSA Encryption Key length: 2048 (bit string)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD X509v2</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. issuerUniqueIdentifier</td>
<td>Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. subjectUniqueIdentifier</td>
<td>Not used</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X509v3 extensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Subject Key Identifier</td>
<td>Resulting from use of the hash SHA-1 function on the TSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Profile of the PKI TSA certificate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>CRITICAL extensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>public key.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Authority Key Identifier</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keyIdentifier</td>
<td>Result of using the hash SHA-1 function on the public key of the issuing CA (CORPORATE CA)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c2 45 2b f4 f9 92 ee 33 59 98 e1 82 75 6b 8c bc d0 b6 e5 c1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>authorityCertIssuer</td>
<td>CN=BANCO DE ESPAÑA – AC RAIZ, O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C=ES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authorityCertSerialNumber</td>
<td>36 6a 52 4d a5 e4 4a f8 41 08 a1 40 9b 9b 76 eb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. KeyUsage</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Digital Signature</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Repudiation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Encipherment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Encipherment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Agreement</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Certificate Signature</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRL Signature</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. extKeyUsage</td>
<td>Time Stamping</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. privateKeyUsagePeriod</td>
<td>Not used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Certificate Policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Identifier</td>
<td>1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.2.1 (CPS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URL CPS</td>
<td><a href="http://pki.bde.es/politicas">http://pki.bde.es/politicas</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice Reference</td>
<td>Certificado sujeto a: Declaración de Prácticas de Certificación del Banco de España. @2004 Banco de España. Todos los derechos reservados (C/Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid-España)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Identifier</td>
<td>1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.2.11 (PC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notice Reference</td>
<td>Certificado de Autoridad de Sellado de Tiempo sujeto a la Declaración de Prácticas de Certificación del Banco de España. @2009 Banco de España. Todos los derechos reservados.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Policy Mappings</td>
<td>Not used</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Subject Alternate Names</td>
<td>URL Address=<a href="http://pkitsa.bde.es">http://pkitsa.bde.es</a></td>
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<td>9. Issuer Alternate Names</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Subject Directory Attributes</td>
<td>Not used</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Basic Constraints</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject Type</td>
<td>End Entity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Path Length Constraint</td>
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<td>12. CRLDistributionPoints</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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### Profile of the PKI TSA certificate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>CRITICAL extensions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPA%D1A-AC%20CORPORATIVA, CN=Internas, CN=PKI, CN=Configuration, DC=BDE, DC=ES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?certificateRevocationList ?base ?objectclass=cRLDistributionPoint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://pki.bde.es/crls/ACcorporativa.crl">http://pki.bde.es/crls/ACcorporativa.crl</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. netscapeCertType</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. netscapeRevocationURL</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. netscapeCAPolicyURL</td>
<td>Not used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. netscapeComment</td>
<td>Not used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. bdeCertType</td>
<td>AUTORIDAD DE SELLADO DE TIEMPO</td>
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<td>(1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.3.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers (OID)

Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers (OID):

SHA-1 with RSA Encryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.5)

#### 7.1.4 Name formats

Certificates issued by PKIBDE contain the X.500 Distinguished Name of the certificate issuer and that of the subject in the issuer name and subject name fields, respectively.

#### 7.1.5 Name constraints

The names contained in the certificates are restricted to X.500 distinguished names, which are unique and unambiguous.

The CN (Common Name) attribute of the DN will be what distinguishes one DN from another. The rest of the attributes will have the following fixed values:

O=BANCO DE ESPAÑA, C=ES

#### 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifiers (OID)

The OID of this CP is 1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.2.11 An X.Y format extension is added to indicate the version.

#### 7.1.7 Use of the "PolicyConstraints" extension

No stipulation.
7.1.8 Syntax and semantics of the “PolicyQualifier

The Certificate Policies extension contains the following Policy Qualifiers:
- Element with identifier ‘1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.2.1’, which corresponds with the CPS. It includes the qualifiers: ‘URL CPS’ with the web address to access the CPS and this CP; ‘Notice Reference’ with a text note on the applicable CPS.
- Element with identifier ‘1.3.6.1.4.1.19484.2.2.11’, which corresponds with this CP. It includes the ‘Notice Reference’ qualifier, with a text note on this CP.

The content for certificates regulated under this policy can be seen in point 7.1.2 Certificate extensions.

7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical “CertificatePolicy” extension

No stipulation.

7.2 CRL Profile

7.2.1 Version number

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

7.2.2 CRL and extensions

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

7.3 OCSP Profile

7.3.1 Version number(s)

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.
8 Compliance Audit and Other Controls

8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Controls for each Authority
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

8.2 IdentityQUALIFICATIONS of the Auditor
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

8.3 Relationship between the Assessor and the Entity being Assessed
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

8.4 Aspects Covered by Controls
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiencies found
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

8.6 Notification of the results
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.
9 Other business and legal matters

9.1 Fees

9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees
No fees are applied for the issue or revocation of certificates under this Certificate Policy.

9.1.2 Certificate access fees
Access to certificates issued under this Policy is free of charge and, therefore, no fee is applicable to them.

9.1.3 Revocation or status information fees
Access to information on the status or revocation of the certificates is open and free of charge and, therefore, no fees are applicable.

9.1.4 Fees for other services, such as policy information
No fee shall be applied for information services on this policy, nor on any additional service that is known at the time of drawing up this document.

9.1.5 Refund policy
Given that there are no fees for this Certificate Policy, no refund policy is required.

9.2 Information Confidentiality

9.2.1 Scope of confidential information
As specified in PKiBDE’s CPS.

9.2.2 Non-confidential information
As specified in PKiBDE’s CPS.

9.2.3 Duty to maintain professional secrecy
As specified in PKiBDE’s CPS.

9.3 Personal Data Protection

9.3.1 Personal data protection policy
As specified in PKiBDE’s CPS.

9.3.2 Information considered private
As specified in PKiBDE’s CPS.
9.3.3 Information not classified as private
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.3.4 Responsibility to protect personal data
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.3.5 Notification of and consent to the use of personal data
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.3.6 Disclosure within legal proceedings
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.3.7 Other circumstances in which data may be made public
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.4 Intellectual Property Rights
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.5 Obligations

9.5.1 Obligations of the CA
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.5.2 Obligations of the RA
As specified in PKIBDE's CPS.

9.5.3 Obligations incumbent on certificate subscribers
The specifications of the PKIBDE CPS notwithstanding, the Time-Stamping Authorities holding certificates under this CP shall also have the following obligations:
- To have a “Time-Stamping Policy” in place that complies with acknowledged best practice for the provision of time-stamping services.
- To have an updated “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices” document that describes said policy, which is accessible to the public and free of charge, which indicates its supervisors and describes its obligations and liabilities, the processes and procedures for managing and operating the TSA, key life cycles, security mechanisms, etc.
- To guarantee compliance with all the considerations and to render time-stamping services as per the requirements and procedures described in said “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices” document.
- To adhere to any additional recommendation or obligation indicated by Banco de España for rendering time-stamping services in this CP.

9.5.4 Obligations incumbent on relying parties
The specifications of the PKIBDE CPS notwithstanding, the parties relying on time-stamping services provided using certificates under this CP shall also have the following obligations:
- To be aware and accept any constraint in the use of time-stamp tokens signed with certificates issued under this CP, indicated by the corresponding “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices”.
- To be aware and to take any precaution stipulated by agreement with the Time-Stamping Authority, in order to obtain time-stamping services.

9.5.5 Obligations incumbent on other participants
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.6 Liabilities

9.6.1 PKIBDE’s liabilities
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.6.2 PKIBDE liability exemption
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

Likewise, PKIBDE as certification services provider, shall not be held liable for the time-stamping services offered using its certificates and, in particular, for the content, reliability or accuracy of the time included on the time-stamp tokens signed and issued with its certificates.

Furthermore, neither will it be liable for any damages that may be forthcoming from the time-stamping services provider, caused by a breach of the obligations and liabilities contained in the “Time-Stamping Policies and Practices” or in this CP.

9.6.3 Scope of liability coverage
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.7 Loss Limits
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.8 Validity Period

9.8.1 Term
This CPS shall come into force from the moment it is published in the PKIBDE repository.

This CP shall remain valid until such time as it is expressly terminated due to the issue of a new version, or upon re-key of the Corporate CA keys, at which time it is mandatory to issue a new version.

9.8.2 CP substitution and termination
This CP shall always be substituted by a new version, regardless of the importance of the changes carried out therein, meaning that it will always be applicable in its entirety.

When the CP is terminated, it will be withdrawn from the PKIBDE public repository; however, it will be held for 15 years.
9.8.3 **Consequences of termination**

The obligations and constraints established under this CP, referring to audits, confidential information, PKIBDE obligations and liabilities that came into being whilst it was in force shall continue to prevail following its substitution or termination with a new version in all terms which are not contrary to said new version.

9.9 **Individual notices and communications with participants**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.10 **Specification amendment procedures**

9.10.1 **Amendment procedures**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.10.2 **Notification period and mechanism**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.10.3 **Circumstances in which the OID must be changed**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.11 **Disputes and Jurisdiction**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.12 **Governing Law**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.13 **Compliance with applicable law**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.14 **Miscellaneous provisions**

9.14.1 **Entire agreement clause**

As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

9.14.2 **Independence**

Should any of the provisions of this CP be declared invalid, null or legally unenforceable, it shall be deemed as not included, unless said provisions were essential in such a way that excluding them from the CP would render the latter without legal effect.

9.14.3 **Resolution through the courts**

No stipulation.
9.15 Other Provisions

No stipulation.
10 Personal Data Protection

10.1 Data Protection Legal Scheme
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

10.2 File Creation and Registration
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.

10.3 Personal Data Protection Act Security Document
As specified in PKIBDE’s CPS.